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12 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, O/PPB

SUBJECT : Current Developments in CIRIS

1. I thought you would be interested in the attached memo from Mr. Froehlke to Vice Admiral Bowen, which says that the development of a Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) is his number one priority. As you know, Mr. Froehlke's office is totally dependent this year on our DCI/NIPE staff, and support to us from OCS, to provide the CIRIS data processing and output.

2. To summarize how we are coming with the major Defense intelligence programs:

(a) The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), formerly called the CIP, is now working on a CIRIS data call that is almost totally the same as the CIA call. The major difference is that the GDIP (and other DoD intelligence programs) are required not only to function and target orient their currently Approved Program for FY 71 as a base reference (same as CIA), but also to supply resource data (not function and target oriented) on their Requested Program for all the FYDP years. (CIA has been asked only to supply data on the Approved Program.) In other words, Admiral Bowen's office hopes to use their CIRIS inputs as one aid in their review this year of current resource proposals.

(b) The CCP's data system at present simply isn't up to the job of giving us meaningful data in all of the CIRIS categories. We knew this before, but for the first time we have gotten NSA to say this to us in public. Admiral Gayler is sponsoring some major changes in the CCP to be effective in next year's cycle, and after investigation Wally Seidel and I believe that they will produce major improvements if they are protected by the Admiral and not killed off by operating level managers. For this year's CIRIS, we have NSA's agreement to give us any of their information we want that is prepared as part of their back-up for their CCP review. Out of this we hope to construct CIRIS submits for the CCP. This will be the first time NSA has ever let this sub-structure data out of their own hands, and we think that precedent is an important gain.

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(c) The [ ] program is still being negotiated at the Froehlke level. The question is not whether we will get the information we want for CIRIS: we will. Rather the issue involves whether that organization is going to have to make a more extensive effort of program review in the mid-summer time frame, to permit better inter-program visibility, rather than holding off for the annual combined program/budget review by ExCom in November.

(d) Mr. Froehlke's office is also taking steps to bring into the CIRIS this year the program administered under Assistant Secretary Frosh.

3. It is too early to predict the form for CIRIS next year (CY 72), but it is likely that there will be some fairly significant changes in order to better fit the cryptologic activities into the total community resources structure. I will be keeping your people up to date on the trends in the Defense Department. By mid-spring it would be helpful if we could have the views within your office on the further development of the CIRIS structure in relation to your internal structure.

4. We are moving in the direction of expanding the use of ADP in support of CIRIS.


(a) One possibility we are exploring involves making it possible for Program Managers (e.g., D/NSA for the CCP, etc.) to furnish computer-produced submits to CIRIS and to their own internal management systems.

(b) Another initiative which I am taking in the immediate future is to present a proposal for tying our projected CIRIS Operations Center directly with the OCS computers. The volume of hard copy and the multiplicity of possible data sets and displays is now so great that we must look to obtaining as soon as possible a remote query capability coupled with a rapid reply in the form of hard copy and by cathode ray tube. I will be asking that this capability be provided during FY 71, and probably expanded in FY 72-73.

STAT

[ ]  
A/D/DCI/NIPE

CC: D/DCI/NIPE



ADMINISTRATION

January 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Jr.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Plans for 1970

It was pleasant, Hal, having an opportunity to discuss the spook shop's plans for 1970 with you. I found it helpful and hope you did also.

In an attempt to make certain that you and I are both on the same wave length, let me outline what I consider to be the general results of our meeting. If this isn't your understanding, let's discuss.

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The fact that our operation is new and faced with innumerable areas of activities creates one of our biggest potential problems. We are going to have to establish priorities. Without priorities, it is almost inevitable that each of us would be going off in a different direction.

Our three top priorities in order are to:

1. Develop a Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System. All other assignments pale in relation to this one because we are handicapped in performing other assignments until we get the CIRIS.
2. Work with the Defense intelligence community in the development of a Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program.


The only reason this isn't the number one priority item is that we do have four individual programs at the present. Our job, therefore, is to coordinate and guide the consolidating of the four into one Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program.

3. Develop a Five-Year Intelligence Plan. Because intelligence is an on-going responsibility, this type of a plan must be relegated to a lower priority than the CDIP. However, there is an obvious need for this type of planning and it is clearly our baby.

I suggest that we discuss these three priorities for '70 with the people in the shop. Let's get their agreement or alter the priorities in accordance with their suggestions. The day-to-day activities should then be coordinated to achieve the three priority objectives.

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(Balance of memorandum omitted here.)



Robert F. Froehlke

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11 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Carl G. Segal

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Documents with Ad Hoc Working  
Group Report

Attached is a copy of the letter which General Cushman has sent to Mr. Froehle making an official transmittal of our Working Group report.

Attached also is a copy of my memorandum which is the document referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of General Cushman's letter. This was intended as a non-technical summary as to where we came out in our report. I hope you will find that I have stated this with no significant inaccuracies. As far as I can determine, everyone seems quite pleased with our committee's results.

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Enclosures  
As stated

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6 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : CCP Information for CIRIS-70 -- What Will be Available to NIRB.

1. This memorandum is to describe the information NIRB can expect to have available from NSA as a result of the agreement in the Ad Hoc Working Group's report, and also to indicate the information NIRB will not be getting concerning cryptologic activity resources.

2. The first point to make clear is that for CIRIS-70 purposes NIRB can obtain whatever information compilations are prepared because they are a part of the detail backing up the formulation of and presentation of the CCP in CY70. Conversely, we will not call for compilations that would have to be hand-done and specially configured just to suit CIRIS-70. (In connection with hand-crafted compilations, however, if NIRB -- in connection with a specific issue study such as a particular NSSM -- requires certain information that is not routinely compiled but can be made available from a record source, NSA will provide this information. The NIRB issue study situation was not a matter which was within our Working Group's terms of reference dealing with the CIRIS-70 data base, and so we did not focus on this point.)

3. What needs to be defined, therefore, is what information can NIRB expect to receive for CIRIS-70 because it is a part of the routine back-up available as a result of preparing for this year's CCP exercise. The answer is as follows:

(b) Manpower allocation. The NSA data will, I understand, tell us the currently Approved Program as of January 1970 in terms of how many officers, enlisted men, U.S. civilians and foreign civilian manpower are at each station (i.e., positions authorized as of the end of the FY). We will not have actual on board strength, but at its present stage of evolution the CIRIS data base for all programs deals only with authorized and not with actual manpower.

(c) But not the players' dollars. The major limitation in NSA data compilations for CIRIS purposes is that they do not compile dollar costs for each station. At the station level, these data identify the costs of new construction, and what the procurement of new equipment costs. The existing data compilations prepared for the CCP do not tell the costs of Military Pay and Operations & Maintenance at each station.



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(e) Functional activities. For CIRIS-70 it was requested that the Approved Program be function-oriented for one year, FY 71. This means identifying activities such as Collection, Processing, Support, and identifying the sensors used. The other major intelligence programs reporting to CIRIS can provide the dollar costs and the manpower allocated in these ways. The CCP cannot do this for funds, but it can do this for manpower. The NSA available data will give insights into what activities are going on, and where, but in general these cannot be costed with precision in dollar terms. We will not know precisely how much we can derive from the NSA available information until it is in hand to be worked with. It should be valuable in a share of the cases where NIRB is trying to zero in on an issue. There are supplementary data reservoirs that can be related in some cases of issue analysis, such as the information in a USIB committee or background in other files. The NSA information should help to decrease the area of ignorance or uncertainty -- more cannot be said until the materials are worked with.

(f) Target information. For CIRIS-70 it was requested that the Approved Program be target-oriented for one year, FY 71. The other major programs reporting to CIRIS all can do this. NSA available information can do this only in relation to their target list, which is their targeted subelements. NSA cannot do this from available information using the CIRIS target categories. A year or so ago, a study indicated that only 15-20% (roughly) of the total CCP costs could be identified to NSA target subelements. The CIRIS staff can make some correlations between our list of targets and NSA's, but as can be seen, the allocation of dollars to anyone's targets is limited. There is no well-developed and generally accepted methodology at present for allocating indirect costs to targets. As to manpower, NSA can relate all of the CCP manpower to each of their subelements, and by interpretation the CIRIS staff could translate quite a bit of this into the standard CIRIS targets.

(g) Activities within stations. There is probably little that can be done with NSA available information to uniformly describe the character of the principal operating, i.e., mission, activities within each station. This is what was attempted last year with Position information but that caused great objection from NSA. Position information or other activity descriptors in some form will appear in the NSA available data, but I cannot tell how useful this will be until we work with the data.

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4. The foregoing compilations of information will be turned over by NSA to the DCI/NIPE CIRIS staff that is under my direction. Our task then becomes one of analysis of this information. From it we may prepare CIRIS forms to be fed into the computerized data base. Information from the NSA compilations will be extracted and aggregated according to the CIRIS terminology and categories. We will fill in as many of the CIRIS display formats as the data permit.

5. This will be quite an analytical chore, and at present I have no past experience to draw on in quantifying the job. On the other hand, this is, I believe, the first time that these sub-surface levels of program and resource detail have been made available at the community level. Herein lies an opportunity as well as a chore, for the best way to understand how to refine and improve a community-wide CIRIS information system for next year is to have first hand experience working directly with the raw materials from each Agency. We have been able to do this over the past two years with the other three big programs, but never until now have we had access to this kind of source material on the system characteristics and complexities in the cryptologic world. So, it can be said that this learning experience is an essential part of the R&D process in system development for CIRIS.

6. Next year it could be a different -- and better -- story. Both Mr. Seidel, the DASD(I) member of the Ad Hoc Working Group, and I were impressed with the breadth and competence shown by the NSA Task Force in taking a fresh look at the entire NSA data system. This was what Admiral Gayler briefly described to NIRB. If Admiral Gayler's Task Force can move ahead fast enough, there could be a whole new ball game next year, because their plans call for providing automatically the kinds of slices and insights which the CIRIS has been seeking, and quite a few more bits and pieces for internal management.

7. Admiral Gayler is undertaking a very considerable task in restructuring the CCP data system that serves operations and management in NSA and the SCAs. There will be a lot of detail to work out and a sizeable computer programming task. These take time, which is quite short now even though such a system were not to be used until next year. The system needs to be brought to a final form by the middle of 1970, since its implementation should be in time for the CY71 programming guidance that generally is issued in mid-fall of each year.

8. These broad-gauged new plans, with which I generally agree, could well be whittled down by delays or challenges of one form or another. Anything that can be done to assist Admiral Gayler's Task Force would be well-deserved; these people are experienced and objective and they will need continued support at the top levels.

  
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence  
and  
Chairman, CIRIS Committee Ad Hoc Working Group

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6 FEB 1970

Need for the Display of Resource Information by Target Area

INTRODUCTION

The PPB system places great stress on resources (money and people) and how they are distributed among Agency components and programs. Knowing how much each component spends on which programs, we can total the amounts spent in the Agency on each of the seven programs.

When we move to the purpose for which the programs exist and for which money is spent, the stress is less evident. The money and people are distributed among headquarters and field installations, but no attempt is made to keep accounts by target objectives. Indicators exist, e.g., the Soviet Bloc Division has the USSR and the Bloc countries as its target; Far East Division has Communist China and other Far East countries as its objective; Western Hemisphere Division emphasizes Latin America, etc. But with the exception of SB Division, all Clandestine Service divisions profess to target against the USSR and Communist China. Similarly, technical and overt collection, as well as production components, profess to concentrate on certain target priorities. But nowhere in the Agency PPB system do we have a statistical summary as to which areas and subjects consume our resources.

Let us ask the question, "What resources do we expend on Cuba?". We know that WH Division, European Division, [redacted] Africa Division, FI Staff, [redacted] and the Office of Communications are involved in collecting information on Cuba to transmit to DD/I and DD/S&T production offices for analysis. But since current budget procedures do not identify expenses by targets, we cannot answer the question accurately. We can only roughly estimate the money and man-years devoted to the Cuban Target.

The lack of target orientation exists both in headquarters and in the field. It is becoming recognized as a management deficiency by some Chiefs of Stations, as illustrated by a recent reply to a query concerning the value of the FASERS system. One COS wrote: "As now structured, FASERS is of little use as a front office management tool. It does provide reasonably current project expenditure figures which are useful in monitoring

25X1 expenditure rates against program ceilings and at project renewal time. The [ ] however, in its operational management is target country oriented, reflecting the line of the OD, OP, and QORs. Since our projects, and therefore FASERS, with minor exceptions are not lined up logically by target country, we get little use from FASERS. We have four FASERS/DSEs for travelers (one for each of four projects) which means that we can push a button and know how much we have spent on travelers against the program ceiling for travelers. But travelers against which target country? Why do you not modify the FASER/DSE system to allow us target country entries, machine incorporation and feedback ... ?" -- A microcosm of the problem facing the Agency as a whole.

The lacuna in the PPB system, therefore, is lack of emphasis on the purpose (target) of the Agency operations. The "why" for the Agency operation should be asked at least with the same frequency as the "how".

#### TARGETING RESOURCES

The Target Oriented Display (TOD) was a step toward providing the answer to the "why". It attempted to determine what the Agency resources were, how they were targeted against geographical areas and subject targets, and how components planned future target coverage. Three years of experience showed the strengths and weaknesses of the TOD approach.

The strengths lie in the simplified approach to tabulating intelligence resources and in the standardization of the intelligence vocabulary so that an over-all look at resource expenditures could be attempted. All Agency components supplied a breakdown of their resources by TOD nomenclature and according to geographical and subject targets. Outside the Agency, the response was uneven, for some services supplied the required information, while others claimed inability to conform to the TOD structure.

The main weakness has been the imprecise nature of the data supplied. In 1969, for instance, only 60% of the funds were targeted. No request was made for personnel figures. The other 40% was spread within the Multi-Purpose and General Support or the World Wide/Multi-Regional area category. Furthermore, the allocation of resources to such prime targets as USSR and Communist China was perhaps made in the expectation that some allocation against these targets was expected. The underlying weakness of the TOD submissions was the lack of conviction on the part of the preparers that the program was used by or even usable by the decision-makers and

that no great care in its preparation was necessary. In fact, little evidence exists that the TOD data has been used for planning, analysis or decision-making concerning the Agency programs.

In recognition of the weaknesses of past TOD submissions, greater emphasis on precise input was incorporated into the Program Call for the forthcoming submission. In expectation of greater usage by the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) and by the centralized intelligence administration in the Department of Defense, the name of the program was changed to the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS). The general structure of the programs and the program's vocabulary remained essentially the same. The 12 geographical area targets remain unchanged. It was recognized, however, that five year projections by targets were unrealistic and placed upon the working elements the responsibility which should rest with the decision-makers, namely, establishing priorities for the future. The program now limits targeting of resources for the budgeted year, e.g., FY 1971 for the March 1970 submission. Thus as the Agency enters on a fiscal year the managers are in a position to know what money and personnel are allocated to any geographical area or target subject.

Displays based on FY 1971 target submissions are programmed to show:

- a. Resources, by program and by geographical targets.
- b. Geographical area targets, by subject area, by program (and calculation of percentage of expenditure against each target by each program) and by component.
- c. Components' allocations against each target, with summaries by directorates.

#### FUTURE POTENTIAL OF CIRIS

The data supplied by the TOD system, even though imprecise, are a harbinger of what the system can accomplish. In summary, it can help the PPB planners and the Agency decision-makers because it:

- a. Presents resource allocations in a common language with that of other intelligence agencies.
- b. Portrays graphically the geographical areas against which Agency resources are currently used.

- c. Portrays what R&D work is carried on in various programs to meet future needs against selected area targets.
- d. Can compare percentage of expenditure by programs against area targets. Such comparison can provide an indicator of relative importance placed upon the target by collection, processing, production, and covert action components.
- e. Presents and compares targeting allocations of each component and of each directorate.
- f. Makes available data on geographical areas as needed by NSC working groups.
- g. Makes more realistic the data presented to the Bureau of the Budget concerning resources allocated to priority areas.
- h. Enables managers to determine whether resource expenditure against given areas, en toto or in individual programs, is valid in terms of the geographical area's intelligence interest.
- i. Gives management a useful tool for making decisions concerning which geographical areas and subjects should be emphasized or de-emphasized in future planning.
- j. Allows directorate managers and field station chiefs a continuing measure on how priority targets are being exploited.
- k. Is readily adaptable to computer processing and to systems analysis.

## OBJECTIVES

The objectives toward which the CIRIS custodians in PPB are working:

### Short-Range

1. Make CIRIS a realistic part of the PPB cycle.
2. Introduce CIRIS data and displays into BOB hearings.
3. Arrange suitable displays for briefing Agency managers.
4. Conduct a campaign to impress upon contributing components the need for precise data on precise areas. Multi-regional and multi-purpose support categories should be minimally used and resources should be apportioned to specific areas whenever possible.

### Long-Range

1. Introduce CIRIS into the PPB MIS at the project level.
2. Require components to amend project outlines to include description of geographical areas and subjects against which the project will be targeted. Such data should be fed into the MIS both initially and as the project is amended.
3. Make CIRIS an integral part of the collection and production planning and resource allocation system.



10 Feb 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT F. FROEHLKE

With reference to your 27 January memo to Hal Bowen on priorities you might as well be aware of my views on information systems. These are fairly well known around the building, but not generally heeded because the siren lure of information systems is too strong.

I know of only one case (IOIC) of an acronymed formal computerized information system that has been successfully brought into existence in usable up to date form. Almost all of the attempts turn out to be more of a liability than an advantage, since year after year people who might otherwise be usefully occupied, waste their time trying to fix up the system so that it will be useful next year, meanwhile doing what always works: keeping notebooks and calling up Joe, who if he doesn't know, can call Sam, who does.

All this by way of saying that if CIRIS is to be a fairly modest system of notebooks (say, one), listing our resources and key information about them, with some computer handling if it later seems necessary, I'm with you. If you mean to start with a computerized information system of vast scope and unbelievable capability, I'm opposed. If we adopt the limited objective we can probably have CIRIS in three months or less and an improved, useful version in six months or less. If you mean the big objective, we will never have it.

ROBERT A. FROSCHE

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